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Summary
In globalization stage, where Multinational companies (MNCs) aggressively expand business
overseas through “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)”. The arising attention on corruption in public
sectors have gradually gained interest and become one of the crucial determinant to assess target host
country for foreign firms. The core of this paper is concentration on how the bureaucratic corruption
of host country has the impact on the FDI performance in term of subsidiaries’ survival. This
empirical study focus Japanese MNCs in automotive sector that established in Asia-Pacific region
total 19 countries with over 1,700 subsidiaries through timeframe from year 1991 to 2004. We
propose that corruption helps MNCs subsidiaries to maintain business in host country against the
major voices of literatures that described corruption cause bad effect to the FDI and MNCs
subsidiaries’ performance. We also study how foreign ownership in corrupt environment has
significant implication to the survival performance. Lastly, we observe for local market-focused
firms under corruption will have great impact to subsidiaries survival rate. The most interesting fact
of this paper is the crucial finding that corruption actually helps Japanese MNCs subsidiaries to
sustain longer, which is counterpoint to the conventional idea of scholars. Therefore, this discovery
is certainly provides Japanese MNCs the outlook of different perspective of corruption impact. It can
contribute great suggestion to Japanese MNCs subsidiaries to foresee foreign market to expand
overseas business in particular of host country with existence of corruption.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In the globalization era, all countries trade more freely not limited to the domestic market,
has provided tremendous benefits to the company especially for the Multinational Enterprise
(MNEs) to pursue internationalization strategy at this stage. Not surprisingly, Foreign Direct
Investment or FDI became a significant important method for MNE’s to invest in overseas market
opportunity. Powerful countries or namely developed countries have high potential exploring FDI in
new foreign markets, mainly referred to United States and top leader in Europe. Including Japan,
stagnant home market and strong appreciation of Yen encourage Japanese MNEs to shift their focus
to overseas. According to Japan, Manufacturing industry plays big role for national economy and top
segment is belong to Auto-motive sector including top worldwide well-known players; Toyota,
Honda, & Nissan. Starting from exporting and gradually move to invest in abroad, establishing the
factory in foreign market give MNEs opportunity and challenge in the same times. In 1980s, besides
US, the no.1 target market of Japanese outward FDI, Asia-Pacific regions also attract
Automobile-related MNEs due to the readiness of national structure. Mainly starting from NIE
nations (Newly Industrialized Economies); China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea (Basu &
Miroshnik, 2000). NIEs nations are able to provide efficiency for establishing the FDI business. On
the other hand, other countries in this Asia Pacific region i.e. Thailand, Indonesia, & Malaysia also
began to establish appealing foundation and policy to gain interest of foreign investment. In Asia
Pacific region, not only the reason of qualified industry point of view, but also the cultural difference
perspective among Asian, is considered to be smaller gap compared to Western countries. Being said,
above characteristics of Asia-Pacific region give benefits to the Japanese firms both operational and
managerial context. On the other hand, the downside of fastest economic growth in this region,
Transparency Organization has observed that the corruption in this region is still not much improved
despite there are plenty of declarations and commitments to fight against corruption based on the
“Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI1) scores”, which started the observation from 1995 onwards
until present to evaluate country transparency in public sector (Transparency Org, 2014). The best
2example is China; country with continually spike on economic growth while CPI scores remains
relatively low (high scores can be implied that the nation achieves high transparency, low corruption
level).
In order for MNE to enter overseas market, there are various determinants how the firm
should select the target country for an important decision of long-term investment. Therefore, the
firm’s decision to pursue international strategies often crucial how they choose to enter the foreign
market that will give an impact for firm’s survival in the selected host country (Youssef & Hoshino,
2003). Due to automobile-related sector requires capital and labor intensive from the initial stage;
setting up the plant, operating the factory, establishing the distribution and market channel is
challenging. All stages are inevitably entail with local government and how to make strategy
response to the host country environment.
The core of this paper is concentration on how the government corruption of host country
has the impact on the FDI performance in term of subsidiaries’ survival. It is essential to select the
sample of Japanese MNE’s subsidiaries survival rate of which had been invested throughout the
Asia-Pacific region. For clear definition in this paper, Asia-Pacific2 region are consist of East Asia,
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. The previous bunch of research studies have been mainly
focused on corruption and FDI in emerging countries, which most of these countries derived quite
similar low level of public organizations’ transparency. However, this empirical study is strategically
pinpoints in Asia-Pacific region besides the target of Japanese MNEs in automobile-related sector, it
is due to this region has considerably various range of corruption level among country members.
This can view as advantage of how Japanese parent firm behavior of entry mode decision is made
when there is different level of corruption, which nowadays it becomes one of the crucial
determinants of host country evaluation. The major propose of this paper it to find whether the
uniqueness of Japanese MNCs characteristics yield positive effect for their survival performance in
the corrupt environment or not. Since most of the studies has suggested that corruption cause
negative effect to foreign firms performance but with main hypothesis of this paper can provide
meaningful disclosure it corruption actually helps not hurt the MNCs survival performance.
3CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Section 1. INTERNATIONAL FDI
After World War II, Japan’s economic regeneration was spectacular. Since 1980s, Japan
gained special positions and economic maturity through effective utilizations of the world trading
system that made Japan became a large exporter of investments. Following the outbound trip of FDI,
all firms in all industries encountered inevitably challenge of appreciation of Yen currency as well as
continuous increases of the labor wage rate year to year. Above reasons made Japanese MNC
reconsider for their position in domestic market due to downward profit if keep producing at home as
main production base. Therefore, not neglecting their share in the international market, it encouraged
Japanese corporations to move their production bases to overseas countries, where main advantages
are lower labor cost. (Basu & Miroshnik, 2000, page7-13)
At that stage, large International Institutions including World Bank and United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are urging developing countries to initiate the
liberalization, creating market-based economic strategies climate to facilitate investment inflows
across countries. One of the outcomes of those development initiatives is regards the intra-company
transactions. The main root cause of this trend is due to the transnational spread of manufacturing and
the development through global production networks (Basu & Miroshnik, 2000, page9)
Rapid globalization era has made world economy bringing profound changes into the
manufacturing industry. While it gives firms the advantage of growing opportunity offered by the
international market, but simultaneously post the challenge of increasing international competition
since all nations able to invest more freely than ever before. “…The world economic output grew in
the mid-1990s at an average annual rate of 3.7 percent; trade increased by more than 8 percent. Trade
between the industrialized world and the developing countries grew even faster at more than 11
percent per year. These flow were augmented by the increase in foreign investment in developing
countries” according to the data of Basu & Miroshnik (2000, page 13).
42.1.1. Japan’s Outward FDI
In the case of Japan, in term of FDI composition, outward FDI outpace the inward FDI.
After World War II, during the period from 1950 to 1990, is the timing that Japan economy was
capable for restructuring, transforming the structure of Japan’s industrial system, shifting its
production and employment from low to high productivity activities including the structure changes in
manufacturing sector. The reasons behind this shift, is described in previous section about the
improvement of wage rates that force the industry adaptation in developing other capability of the
technology, automation, and train the workers become more efficient along with the changing
circumstance. Undoubtedly, once mentioned about manufacturing sector, Japan’s automobile sector
has dominated manufacturing activities by the 1970s. (Magnus et al, 2000)
From the restructuring of Japan’s economy and transforming of Industry system from
overwhelming economic force, three main influential elements that create impact to Japanese business
have been summarized by speech of Hida (1996). Firstly, an emerging Asia-Pacific, a region with high
economic growth region with benefit of an extremely cost competitive supply source especially for
the manufacturing companies to establish robust supplier and production network. Secondly, the
strengthening of Japanese yen to the dollar and other currencies widely effect has persuaded
Japanese industries to pursue international expansion outsourcing, and thirdly, the collapse of the
bubble economy and the grave financial problems.
According to above reasons, if we take a look at the Japanese outward FDI trend in figure 1,
certainly United States is ranked no.1 due to the size of market, following by the Asian region with
rapid industrialization and growing economic growth. Not only Japan, but other investor also interest
investing in Asian-Pacific that will create a significant impact on the pattern of world trade.
5Japan has invested in a significant way starting from high interest in East Asia due those
countries were viewed as “Newly Industrializing Economies”, namely AsianNIEs; Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Singapore, an important destination with strong economic and existing fundamental
infrastructure and technology suitable for Japanese manufacturing overseas expansion. Apart of listed
nations, other countries such as China, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, & Philippines also become
popular destination among Japanese corporations for a medium to long-term perspective investment.
Since those countries began to strengthen well-defined system and healthy trade environments to
facilitate the foreign investment inflow to their countries. Particularly for Japan, their aim to attract
Japan to establish a production base in their home to accelerate the economic growth. For Japanese
corporations, they seek to set up a production base parallel with sale system to meet the needs of local
markets within this region. For China, the most common reason to invest is to secure the favorable
cheap labor while for ASEAN is to maintain and/or expand market shares with the future opportunity
for export objective.
Although, until mid 1990s Asian received relatively high foreign investment originating
Figure 1 Japan Outward FDI (source: JETRO)
6from Japan (Outward FDI) but it began to decline from 1996 onwards. The starting of financial
collapse era was indeed created in Japan during the late 1980s with excessive credit expansion by the
banking sector (Basu & Miroshnik, 2000, page 28). Until the consequence made impact in the early
of 1990s, problems of the nonperforming loan grew larger and have reduced the ability of the
banking sector to expand credit. The resulting reduction of domestic investments has provoked
Japanese industries, particularly in the medium and small-scale sector, to invest in foreign locations
to avoid the depression in the domestic economy. Unfortunately, the thunderstorm from Asia has
followed, well known as Tom Yum Kung crisis, occurred in 1997. Originally caused in Thailand
with the inappropriate policy of fixing the exchange rates relative to the dollar, which was
automatically put itself in position of less competitive. The crisis has spread through out Asia,
including Japan, which invested high amount in many countries in this region. Although Japan was
injured from consecutive crisis domestically and regionally impact, but with massive involvement in
Asian economies and consolidated investments in Asia, Japan persisted their support by giving hand
to help those countries. Perhaps Japan was most likely be optimistic that most of countries affected
by the crisis will be successfully revived.
2.1.2. Japanese FDI in Manufacturing Industry
After the rise in the value of the Japanese Yen began in 1985, leading to new emerging
trend: a strong focus in the importance of production and employment outside Japan by Japanese
companies. Employment in Japanese affiliates abroad, which had been below 2 percent of aggregate
home employment since the early 1970s, rose to over 5 percent by 1996 (Magnus et al, 2000).
According to JETRO’s survey of Japanese companies abroad from 1990 to 1995, 46.8 percent of the
companies in Hong Kong and 42.9 percent in Singapore have invested in neighboring countries. For
Japan, investments in third countries as affiliated companies in Asia were most remarkable in Hong
Kong and Singapore. The reason was clear. According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI),
foreign direct investments in Asian manufacturing were more profitable than those in North America
or in Europe (Basu & Miroshnik, 2000, page58-59). Along with rising of Japanese labor wage, Japan
7manufacturing company’s overseas employment is growing from 5 to 6.5 percent of home
employment before 1985 to 19 percent in 1996 (Magnus et al, 2000). The trend is continued to
increase among multinational corporations (MNCs), employment abroad rose from under 40 percent
of home employment in 1977 to 55 percent in 1992, while the affiliate share of production of Japanese
manufacturing MNCs rose from 6.5 to 16.5 percent. Value added in Japanese manufacturing affiliates
abroad roughly doubled in size relative to total manufacturing value added in Japan between 1980 and
1992. This can be implied that Japanese MNC gradually relies their confidence and importance of the
production to overseas manufacturing affiliates because the observed parents’ share of Japanese
manufacturing was shrinking in domestic. From this evidence, Japanese firms apparently began a
geographical reallocation of the activities, and particularly those of MNCs in manufacturing rather
than in services sector. During this stage of restructuring of Japanese economy characteristics and
industry transformation being described in previous section, has led to the reallocation of Japanese
MNCs. Although, Japanese outward FDI is still not large relative to the Japanese economy, but this
restructuring economic phenomena has made Japanese MNCs particularly those of multinational
manufacturing firms, capable of expanding the shares abroad and sustain the foreign market (Magnus
et al, 2000). The background behind the high growth rate of Japanese to shift overseas possibly relate
to the “Keiretsu”, the typical Japanese system that is essential for manufacturing industry. During the
last few decade Japanese automakers have developed a complex system of relationships with their
suppliers. The Keiretsu group is formed to enhance high efficiency and business environmental
adaptability of Japanese firms. Usually, this group structure aims to reduce the transaction costs and
enhances coordination between the automaker and its suppliers in such long-term relationships basis
that made buyer-supplier agreements became more like a partner (Tabeta & Rahman, 1999). Toyota,
Nissan, and Honda are best example of Kigyo Keiretsu group that shows the relationship between the
auto assemblers with the parts suppliers. Those firms that belong to the group explicitly identify
themselves as members of the group. Normally, the auto-maker owns the shares of their big suppliers
to easily facilitate the collaboration i.e. Toyota and Toyota-Denso.
82.1.3. Entry Strategy of International FDI
In order for a firm to accomplish success in foreign market, there must be effective
evaluation to select the target destination “host country” evaluating from various determinants and
examine the difference between home and host country differences. In general, to explore FDI, the
firm must evaluate local regulation in host country whether it will gain beneficial if they are going to
establish the business. Theoretically, the major purpose of FDI has been classified into
market-seeking FDI, resource-seeking FDI, and Efficiency-seeking FDI. Once identify the primary
purpose of the parent company among investors that is going to varied base upon the company goal
and motives in making their decision to enter to that certain host country target (Mehlic et al, 2012).
Their investigation is based on theory by Dunning, who came up with three advantages for firms to
evaluate the decisions and opportunity cost for processing foreign direct investment decision-making
method (FDI). These advantages consist of Ownership advantage in the host country (competitive
advantage in terms of corporate reputation, specific knowledge etc.), Location of the host country
(why is it important for investor) and Internationalization advantage (why is it better to do multiple
FDIs than a single on). Specifically from the previous research about Japanese investment, Japanese
MNEs have several key reasons to invest abroad in term of international business expansion effort.
Voyer & Beamish (2004) have mentioned about Nitsch et al. study in of Japanese FDI in Europe for
main purpose of market expansion. Other main reasons included local government incentive, the
desire to establish a host country export base, adopt measures against trade friction, and an attempt
to collect information. The emphasized that there are significant differences across countries in
perspective of performance, industry, mode, and reasons for making the investment and that the
country choice is not free of consequences. Since once firm made decision to enter to the host
country, it must carefully consider overall aspects in particular the fact of entry mode, that is costly
to reverse and therefore post a firm with significant implication for long-term performance, such
decision may not be immediately but directly apparent to not only small firms but also for large
MNEs (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006). Particularly international strategies of MNEs to enter foreign
market, not only the monetary performance but also crucial for the survival of the company in
9foreign market (Youssef & Hoshino, 2003) where the local environment is somehow different from
the home country where the company is founded.
Voyer and Beamish (2004) has reviewed from Dunning’s findings that investors tend to to
reduce uncertainty when deciding to invest abroad since it cope with the risk and unfamiliar
circumstance. In accordance to Habib,M. and Zurawicki,L. (2002), analyzed two important aspects
how firms assess the host country’s characteristics. First aspect is related to the “lower level of
uncertainty in psychically close countries” from Johanson and Vahlne’s finding and second aspect is
being descried as “psychic closeness” facilitating learning about the target countries from Kogut and
Singh’s conclusion. Over the years, studies were undertaken by number of researchers. Some
researchers corroborated the hypothesis that firms expand first to the psychically close and then
move to the more psychically remote countries. While some researchers argue that the initial FDIs
are made in the target destination that are culturally closer to the home country to minimize the risk
of cultural difference and avoid misinterpretation of the such unusual culture. Recently, well-known
four dimensions to evaluate global expansion strategy developed by Harvard’s professor
Ghemmawat. His framework consists of four classification of distance between home and host
country; cultural, administrative, geographic and economic (CAGE framework). According to
CAGE taxonomy, difference in corruption levels between the host and home countries is accounted
as a part of the administrative distance that creates important barriers for foreign investors. Therefore,
MNEs must concern the perceived level of corruption in the host country as investors evaluate all
factors when deciding on country choice (Voyer & Beamish, 2004). Earlier government
related-criteria for FDI decision making process has been summarized in the book of
Basu & Miroshnik, 2000, page38-48) with 7 main categories; Ownership policies, Taxes/subsidies,
Convertibility of currency, Prices controls, Performance requirements (i.e. export, local content, and
foreign exchange balancing mandates), Sector-specific incentives and limitations, Miscellaneous
application and entry procedures. For Multinational companies in the developing countries frequently
manipulate not only government decisions, but also the broader political process. Corruption, attempts
to manipulate regulations on the environment, and tax evasion normally include manipulation of the
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political system which this paper will explained in depth-analysis in the section 2.2).
Once viewing from large indication, host country GDP (level of economy and power of the
market) also plays an essential influence on entry mode choices (Youssef & Hoshino, 2003). The
next stage is concerned with local government conditions, which often refer to the pillar of existing
laws and regulations to ensure country’s stability and society’s uniformity (Yiu & Makino, 2002). It
is directly related to market legitimacy that MNEs need to attain, while normative legitimacy takes a
longer time to be established in the value systems of the host-country nationals. The major influence
on entry mode also associated with culture dimensions. Luo (2002) has introduced the word
“environmental hazards”, the concept is related how firms viewed which mode is effective to host
curtailing environmental threats depends on the controllability in response to country environmental
risks arising from local government. The joint venture and wholly owned entry modes alleviate
environmental risks differently. Local partners of a joint venture use country specific knowledge and
well-established relationships with their business community and governments to help the venture
decrease host country environmental risks while the wholly owned mode can ensure an MNE's
organizational control or legitimacy over local activities, reducing contextual influence by adjusting
its dependence on a host setting. In emerging markets, such hazards are inevitable and difficult to
control. For firm’s level, when the degree of ownership is less high but not too low, both the size of
the parent company and the socio-cultural distance variable are important in the choice of the entry
mode (Youssef & Hoshino, 2003).
In this study, it mainly examined two main entry modes; joint venture and wholly owned
mode, which widely used among the researchers to conduct the study related to FDI entry mode
strategy. These two modes are distinct in term of equity management. Rosenzweig and Sign has
explained that entry mode represents an organizational form and objectives appropriate for the firm’s
motivation to obtain legitimacy in the relevant environments under the conditions of uncertainty in
the host country. In the arena of international expansion, firms face a dual pressure of conformity; to
the organizational practices within the multinational enterprise. A great pressure from the parent firm
to conform can predict the preference that will lead to a particular entry mode, in which require to be
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consistent with the parent organizational practice from the study analyzing with sample of 362
Japanese overseas subsidiaries (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Furthermore, parent firm might encounter
pressure from host-country institutions that possibly induce firms to trade their ownership for
legitimacy in the local environment. In consideration of incurred cost establishing business in
foreign market, firm to economize on their costs associated with the use of both arm’s length
transactions based on market mechanisms and the administrative mechanisms. Hence, parent firm
most likely prefer Joint ventures mode or local strategic alliances once they concern about pressure
from host country institutions (Yiu & Makino, 2002). Joint venture is also popular in case parent
firms in aspect of cultural distance between home and host countries. Once the gap is large and the
host countries’ regulative and normative (cultural distance) restrictions were relatively strong, MNEs
are more likely to enter the host country through via Joint venture over Wholly owned mode due to
parent firm is willing to avoid that kind of cultural barrier when operating business in foreign market
based on the empirical study of Agarwal, Kogut, and Singh (Yiu & Makino, 2002). The joint venture
mode is then deemed to be more powerful than the wholly owned mode in neutralizing
environmental deterrence (Luo, 2002). Joint venture is expected to give more effective in reducing
environmental obstructions to capability exploitation and development than the choice of wholly
owned mode in a dynamic context. Indirectly, it also provides a parent firm the advantage to learn
from local partner and develop the understanding of local market.
In case when observing the amount of investment made by MNEs, the size of FDI does
matter that firms might select Joint venture if investment is expected to be huge, in order to
minimize the risk, dispersing financial risks of investment to local partner (Yiu & Makino, 2002).
Specifically, narrowing down from the whole investment perspective to the cost that is going to
incurred in establishing business overseas, the firm has to confront with transactions costs
concerning factors and seek if there are potential partners in the host country, and other remaining
costs related to the need for acquiring information about new institutional environments and their
workings. Thus, Joint venture became the good mode for MNEs in this view (Youssef & Hoshino,
2003).
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In opposite criteria, it is suggested that Wholly owned subsidiary is preferable for Japanese
investors if the parent company is in he same industry as the planned subsidiary in local (Youssef &
Hoshino, 2003). In the sense if parent company hold specific knowledge of asset associated high
cost under the circumstance involve in behavioral uncertainty, those assets concerned become highly
specific to the transactions, parent firm is more likely to adopt high-control entry-modes (Wholly
owned mode) than low-control modes (Joint ventures / Non-equity mode) (Yiu & Makino, 2002).
This is rational due to Wholly owned mode provides MNEs with better monitoring systems for such
hazards than a joint venture. The controllability and legitimacy is crucial to prevent risk of the
unwanted dissemination of their own proprietary assets and the failure to fully appropriate the rent
generated by the assets transferred to their subsidiaries since joint venture partners may minimize
MNEs protection power of their core technology assets in the presence of behavioral uncertainties
and given that a transaction is recurrent. In addition, Yiu & Makino’s study is suggested that there
are higher possibility that manufacturing subsidiaries were more likely than non-manufacturing
subsidiaries to be established through a Joint venture when pursuing FDI overseas.
2.1.4. International FDI Performance Measurement
Evaluating such how well FDI Performance is, often utilize the monetary measurement,
that is truly favorable when looks at the number how well the MNE achieve revenue, profit margin,
or growth rate that is ordinary to do quick comparison between planned and actual figures, or
checking financial performances between parent and subsidiary status. However, one of the
meaningful performance measurements of International FDI is “Survival” (Ren et al, 2009). This
paper summarizes previous researchers mentioning about survival rate as one of the common
indicators of International Joint Venture performance. Nguyen (2011) explained survival and exit is
frequently used subsidiary performance measures too. The challenge is also regards challenge to
obtain objective performance data of subsidiary operations is relatively difficult (Brouthers, 2002) as
some major impediments are that firms feel more or less reluctance to disclose financial data at
subsidiary level and become burden especially for large MNEs normally invest to number of
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subsidiaries overseas that operate in various accounting standards between countries. The basic
assumption of this approach is that the longer the subsidiary survives, the more successful it is
because for international FDI, it is expected to be sustainable only as long as it represents the most
efficient organization mode. In this context, longevity thus represents a sign success while
termination from the host country is a failure (Ren et al, 2009). The paper of Delios & Beamish
(2001) also reviewed previous researches and obtained the justification that the use of survival as
a performance measure has been based on its modest correlation with subsidiary profitability.
Additionally, in order to exist in long-term is certainly an ultimate goal for every organizations to
maintain in the overseas, and therefore, the subsidiaries’ survival is going to be the main indicator of
MNEs performance in this empirical study.
Section 2. CORRUPTION
Corruption was defined by the Oxford Dictionary as an activities involving dishonest or
illegal behavior (Voyer & Beamish, 2004). To the extent of corruption in the public sector, it is an
abuse of public office for private gain. In this study, the focal point is zoom in to government
corruption not the corruption embedded in the level of internal organization. Corruption is like an
exchange, requires two actors; a buyer and a seller (OECD). The buyer in the private sector contact
the seller in the public sector to obtain something valuable or their own favors illegally, such as
allocating perfectly legal for an exchange import license trade or providing something the buyer does
not deserve such as exemption from valid regulation or permission fairly to other parties. The
transactions involve behavior by officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants,
they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those who has close connection to them, by
misuse of the power entrusted to them (Transparency International, 2000). Corruption is widespread in
countries where the administrative apparatus enjoys excessive and discretionary power, and where
laws and processes are barely transparent (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Bribes can even be used to
induce public authorities to harass the buyers’ competitors. The reason that corruption persists is
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because the companies (or the buyer) can use it as a process to advance their own interests. In fact, if
each every single investor (domestic and foreign) resisted corruption, those combined power would
have wipe it out but that scenario has low possibility to occur because a game of "outsmarting" others
is sometimes played (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Since corruption benefits to participants on both
sides (buyer and seller), neither party has an incentive to end the relationship unilaterally. There is
no way to this disentangle the network to affix blame on just one of the participants since both
parties bear responsibility involving in corruption. Corrupt buyers and sellers frequently develop
system that continued reinforcing and persist over time. Those systems not only effective channel to
hide an illegal money (bribes) but also good in case of the disposal of unlawful funds (OECD). From
the paper of Mehlic et al (2012), there are different ways of describing corruption, from the
investment risk to the specific acts of bribery, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and/or
embezzlement. If looking corruption as negative indicator, it often assigned to the economies where
there is lagged in development, namely developing or underdeveloped countries. To the extent that
corruption exists as a policy problem, it is probably wise to accept it as a particularly intractable part of an
underdeveloped country. As it was summarized that corruption plays a destructive role in the progress
and development of most societies (Naved & Oscar, 2007). However, from the standpoint of
developed countries, corruption is serious issue that requires strong and continuous measure along
with big attention from government authorities’ collaboration to get rid of it. The well-known public
institute who closely work on this issue is “Transparency Organization”, setting up new index called
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to measure country’s level of corruption. It reaffirms how essential
the world see corruption plays a significant factor in the dimension of business and investment.
Although there is growing concerns to eliminate the corruption, but still certain number of
multinational business firms face a dilemma when they deal with corrupt regimes. Each believes it
needs to pay bribes in order to do business, but each knows that all of them would be better off if
none of them paid (OECD). On a superficial level, it may be logical that corruption creates its own
political and economic interests that will resist efforts at its eradication. More important, corruption is an
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activities that promptly happened but it is deeply rooted in the psychological and social structure of the
countries where it exists (Leff, 1964).
Generally, people viewed corruption as negative thing. Also several researchers have studied
that corruption cause the bad impact to the economy and societies due to it created uncertainty circumstance
to conduct business fairly in the market where it exist (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006; Naved et al, 2007; Mehlic
et al, 2012). As mentioned above, government corruption has become a serious problem for
international organizations and individual nation. It has been shown to significantly diminish both
macroeconomic development as well as firm-level growth. Pattern of Globalization has raised the
likelihood that firms will encounter corruption (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006). The evidence that most of
countries that lag growth in nation’s development in some way, do involve in corruption matter
(Naved et al, 2007; Mehlic et al, 2012).Due to it provide risky environment for investment especially
to the foreign firms. Specifically to investors, it affects in a multiple ways. First, from investment
perspective, corruption brings high transaction costs. Once that firm decided to participate in corruption to
facilitate the business transactions, it involve extra payments known as “bribes” which is the cost that will
eventually add up to final product cost expense, distort the allocation of resources and the price of goods
and services for consumers that further lead to decreasing of investor’s prices competitiveness (John et al,
2003). Likewise, corruptions act as irregular tax on business, add up the costs and distorting
incentives to invest (Alemu, 2013). Second, since this illegal behavior should have done privately, but if
the information was disclosed, it suddenly creates cost in term of firm’s reputation damage. The side effect
of corruption scandal is surely strong and ultimately perceived by societies and customers in host countries
in negative way that the firm’s brand erosion is high and difficult to rebuild the ethical image. Last factor is
corruption is a risk. A country that exhibits a high existence of corruption may foreshadow a potential social
unrest and political instability since corrupted governments result in economic and social polarizations in
that society. (John et al, 2003). Further research on corruption identifies numerous direct and indirect
costs when firms operating in countries where government corruption is obvious. Firms might have
to deal with corruption-related costs such as bribes and queuing costs while others studies explained
the effect of corruption also due to uncertainty surrounding corrupt transactions rather than from any
monetary cost and frequency (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006).
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Still, there are also opponent views from researchers that corruption may help firms in
many ways operating the business. The debate on the effects of corruption is relatively fervent.
Some authors have suggested that corruption possibly raise economic growth via two types of
mechanisms. First, corrupt practices such as “speed money” would enable firms to avoid
bureaucratic delay especially if that particular host country with excessive regulations or high degree
of red tape. Second, the government employees who are allowed to levy bribes would work harder,
especially in the case where bribes act as a piece rate (Mauro, 1995 ). Alemu (2013) has summarized
the concept of corruption as a “Helping-hand theory, supported by many economists such as Lui,
Beck and Maher and Sala, claimed that rather than obstacle for business, corruption could be an
efficient “lubrications” for rigid economic regulations. It can have a positive impact on investment
for foreign firms by facilitating transactions in countries with excessive regulations. Similarly to
some literatures suggest that corruption can be beneficial to growth in so far in case that it allows to
by-pass overburdening government regulation (Leff, 1964).
2.2.1. Determinants of Corruption in National level
Once we have basic understanding how corruption is viewed from the perspective of
academic researchers from previous section. In this section, will focus the important determinants of
corruption in country-level, discussing how each factor has linkage to the corruption.
It is possible to say the connection between bribes (illegal payment) and other
determinants. Mudambi et al (2012) provided that illegal informal exchanges involve the misuse of public
power for private benefit, through unauthorized payments of money or other in-kind substitutes, Such
material payments in turn for favors performed by public officials take the form of “bribes”. Bribes is
taking place in an occasions once there is dealing with low efficiency of government institutions
whether it relate to low efficiency or unclear legal framework, high burden of regulations, or low
transparency of laws and process, in order for a firm to get rid or minimize the being said problems.
However, in order to gain benefits or what firm is asking for about unlawful requests to the
government institute after complete paying the bribe is not 100 percent guarantee. Because of
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uncertainty is often occurred for corruption, firms should carefully consider about this fact as being
said that if bribery becomes a requirement for potential investors, risks increase and the costs of
non-compliance increase as well (Voyer & Beamish, 2004). Further research of 54 developing
countries suggested that bribery does not improve government efficiency in the presence of pervasive
government regulations Naved & Oscar (2007). Pervasiveness of corruption refers to the degree that
corruption is dispersed broadly throughout the public sector in a country (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006).
In order to evaluate country’s corruption, one possible variable is to assess the legal system
of country, Mauro (1995) applied this variable to measure efficiency and integrity of the legal
environment that have an effect to the business especially to the foreign firms. In the aspect of
regulatory environment in an economy that corruption exist, namely where firms face legal obstacles to
enter an industry or operate a business. Politicians use their temporary monopoly rights to distort economic
policy to generate large rents for themselves. This implies that regulations in developing and emerging
economies tend to be either loose and effective or strict and ineffective (Mudambi et al, 2012). In the case
that the country has high pervasiveness of corruption, it influence administrative apparatus enjoys
excessive and discretionary power, and where laws and processes are barely transparent (Habib &
Zurawicki, 2002). Speaking of legal framework, the degree of transparency is important as well as the
degree of its efficiency. “Transparency” refers to how well the government communicates its policies and
regulations clearly to the public (IMD). In a country where the degree of transparency is high, the
government must be open to the public and the government information is widely communicated in the
public interest. For FDI, it is critical to check if foreign market characterized with an inadequate
transparency, the poor transparency implies high transaction cost potential that might impact to foreign
investment. Due to low transparency of government legal framework also increase the bureaucratic
inefficiency that can be translated into potential hidden costs in the form of indefinite delay of issuing
licenses and unexpected and frequent changes of investment rules and regulations for firms. The major
implication of poor transparency on foreign investors, who are unfamiliar or lack of insight information of
the host country’s legal and regulatory systems, the low degree of transparency therefore provide firms
inadequate legal protection (John et al, 2003). Therefore, apart from its direct dimension (monetary
value) cost of investment, MNEs in decision process of FDI in that host country should also evaluate
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the extent of clarify of country’s laws, the extent and honesty of law enforcement, the efficiency of the
bureaucracy (Mehlic et al, 2012). MNEs should understand that low transparency implies high
uncertainty for them to run the business. When local government apparatus follow “hidden agenda”,
“internal documents”, and the vagueness of the policy and regulations, the uncertainty of running business
increases. This enhanced uncertainty in the business environments would compound complexity of
managing the FDI in overseas (John et al, 2003).
Apart of the context of legal system itself, what foreign firms must thoroughly assess is how
much if the burden of government regulation as this variable indicates how many complex process and
regulation a firm must attain in order to perform business in the host country successfully. One of the
recent focal areas of transition in economic policies in many nations worldwide has been towards how to
reduce burden of government regulation. As excessive regulation has a linkage to corruption, deregulation
and privatization can be effective measures to fight corruption, to increase competition in an economy, and
to lower the level of opportunistic behavior of state official. Accordingly, policies aimed at liberalization,
deregulation, and privatization are macro-level factors that can significantly reduce opportunities for
corruption. The burden of government regulation can also be connected to the extent of corruption in an
economy, via either the public interest view or public choice theory (Mudambi et al, 2012). From their
paper, they reviewed previous empirical study regards the connection of burden of regulation, corruption
and location decision of MNEs, suggesting that in particular, when comparing two locations with relatively
similar level of corruption, the next criteria managers would be well advised to examine is the underlying
burden of government regulation. In order to minimize the bad effect of corruption, the positive outcome if
country focus to reduce regulatory burden, bring more transparency, create higher levels of competition, it
finally lead to the reduction of returns to public sector corruption.
Nevertheless, if firms who decided not to participate in the bad cycle behavior of corruption and
realized that they receive impact from unfairly consequence of corruptions, there must be available channel
for these victim firms to notify that can name as “legal in dispute setting”. The idea of a dispute resolution
mechanism deserves further scrutiny to determine if there is a feasible way to create a body to hear
complaints by firms claiming to have lost business to rivals as the result of corruption, In establishing
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a general forum for resolving disputes, there are clearly some difficult problems of proof and standards
of decision (OECD).
In summary, in host country where corruption is pervasive, a firm's political strategy must
contemplate dealings with potentially corrupt officials and integrate the appropriate management
practices. One of the most discouraging facets of corruption is its persistence, and the limited
successes of anticorruption campaigns (Rodriguez et al, 2006). The paper explained the facts that still
few literatures have been established regarding firm strategies for dealing with corruption. Although
recent research on corruption has focused on firms' engagement with managerial responses to
corruption, it was still not yet clear how firms adapt to corruption environment other than through
market avoidance.
On the other hand, it also requires collaboration of leaders and workers in government
institute to eliminate the corruption activities as the evidence that the institutional inefficiency causes
low investment. The finding that corruption is negatively and significantly associated with
investment is consistent with the view that corruption lowers the private marginal product of capital
(Mauro, 1995). Therefore, it should not be neglected and prioritize as the top issue of the country.
2.2.2. Corruption Impact to FDI
Again, in this area, the paper refers to corruption related to government in national level, and
therefore has introduced the term “Bureaucratic corruption”. It describes a form of corruption where
corrupt behavior among government bureaucrats results in increased costs for MNE operations to
proceed FDI decision. Bureaucratic corruption should result in high transaction costs that increase the
MNEs’ costs of doing business in the host country (Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007). It is confirmed in the
paper of Mudambi et al (2012) that has uncovered a number of host country institutional factors
(political, social, and economic) related to firm performance and FDI inflow. Due to if MNEs pursue
internationalization strategy, it inevitably requires dealing with additional costs of doing business
abroad or a liability of foreignness and some of these costs involve dealing with corruption in the host
country (Cuero-Cazurra, 2006) because for MNEs, the actual cost of conducting business activities in
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the corrupted host country is higher than what could be expected based on observable costs such as
wages or transport costs. Based on this reason, corruption gives rise to extra costs that the MNE has to
operate in the host economy (Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007). Also money paid for bribery represents the
inefficiently allocated resources of firms (Mehlic et al, 2012). In conclusion, bribery may bring
immediate benefits to individual firms but a higher level of corruption tends to increase the overall
level of uncertainty in doing business in country (Lee & Hong, 2010).
The corruption represents additional cost and uncertainty to MNEs (Dahlstrom & Johnson,
2007; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Mehlic et al, 2012; Uhlenbruck et al, 2006). The risk and uncertainty
is given a title in the academic world as “Arbitrariness”, a degree of uncertainty and capriciousness
associated with public sector corruption (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006). When market economy institutions
are underdeveloped, they fail to fulfill their function of reducing uncertainty and arbitrariness, and the
existence of uncertainty enlarge the power of bureaucrats and the probability that they will engage in
corrupt behavior. The arbitrariness is level up between the interaction of bureaucrats and MNEs
particularly in the country that lack of developed formal institutions because once formal institutions
are under-developed, the influence of government bureaucrat automatically increases. Furthermore, if
institutions fail to restrict the behavior of bureaucrats, these individuals have the opportunity to
develop informal institutions that include corrupt behavior. Hence, Arbitrariness in interpreting and
enforcing laws and regulations creates an uncertainty that bureaucrats can take advantage to extract
monetary gains for their own since they have control power for the regulations and laws that affect the
business of MNEs as they need to follow under those regulations to perform business domestic
(Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007). As Lee & Hong (2010) summarized that the uncertainties created by
discretionary regulatory power will add significant costs of doing business in host countries with
high tendency of corruption because regulatory agencies enjoy excessive and discretionary power.
Corruption causes a disincentives effect due to it produces bottlenecks, heightens uncertainty (Habib
& Zurawicki, 2002) which means additional risk is significant for potential investors (Mehlic et al,
2012).
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Corruption is generally portrayed as an important barrier to FDI, with negative effect on the
business environment as it is not provide fair competition among firms in that particular host market
(Mehlic et al, 2012; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). In the other word, Corruption inhibits the
development of fair and efficient markets. It does not give all competitors an equal market access,
prices and quality become less important than access, since bribery took place secretly. Payments to
the host country officials do not have a market value and, hence, raise the cost of goods when
compared to a competitive market (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). In that sense, such crucial concern to
investors, MNEs should check the difference in in the exposure to corruption between the host and
home countries. According to the result of previous literatures, corruption is indeed recognized as one
of the biggest obstacles to FDIs but there also different perspective from investors, bribery can help
them attain its goal easily as it able to accelerate their pace to enter to that targeted market. It is said
that certain investors perceived corruption as a trade-off decision with market attractiveness as in some
cases, the large markets is too attractive to ignore the opportunity to do business, including the benefit
to gain economies of scale in production and sale of product in the local market (Mehlic et al, 2012)
with results reported that corruption effects differ between a certain group of countries or that they are
not significant in their influence on FDI. The best example is China and India, where corruption level
is significant but become important recipients for great inward FDI (Alemu, 2013). Moreover,
interesting finding is not only the level of corruption in the host country may affect FDI inflow but
possible for reverse effect. Lastly, in paper of Mehlic et al (2012) has reviewed the study of Hakkala
et al and found that firms are less likely to invest in corrupt countries with the differences between the
effects on the horizontal investments and on vertical and export platform investments.
For MNEs to make their entrant to the host market, it is unavoidable to interact with various
host country organizations, including the government and its bureaucracy. Hence, host nation’s
government bureaucrats have the opportunity to bend or even break rules and regulations for personal
gain (Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007). Uhlenbruck et al (2006) has suggested that in a country where it
is high pervasiveness of corruption, and it is widely perceived by all firms that the possibility to
imitate corruption activity over competitors is high, it gives a higher likelihood that entering firms
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operating in the country will also engage in corruption. Particularly for MNEs, equity entry requires
not only a major resource commitment, but also ongoing direct management of the subsidiary and
long-term interaction with various local government agencies. Their subsidiaries require local
registration, permits, and various other government services, which all processes involving
opportunities for extortion. Hence, the more pervasive corruption is, the more likely MNE subsidiaries
are to encounter such pressures to engage in corruption (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006). Some studies even
said that an increase in corrupt activities in a country makes corrupt behaviors more attractive as the
probability for getting caught is slim when high chances of firms interact with bribes. For this reason,
high corrupted country, MNC subsidiaries would be less likely to be caught for bribing (Lee & Hong,
2010).
The next issue is if they decided to engage in corruption, how MNEs will find the channel
to interact with government institutions since it is done privately (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Lee &
Hong, 2010; Cuero-Cazurra, 2006). Compared to local firms, MNCs are less informed about who
and how to bribe. Besides the fact that it is costly to develop expertise on how to deal with bribery in
the host country because invisible guides or consulting firms that can provide knowledge about how to
bribe successfully because it is illegal nature for such services. Once MNEs decided to engage in
corruption, it is challenge to understand of the subtleties involved in offering a bribe owing to the
illegal nature of the offer; simply offering a bribe, not just the payment thereof, is a criminal offence
Cuero-Cazurra, 2006). For this reason, in a more corrupt host country, MNCs may have a
considerable disadvantage compared with local firms (Lee & Hong, 2010).
The following step lies on decision how MNEs will decide their entry strategy (in this
case, mainly focus on equity level; Wholly owned or Joint Venture mode) in the corrupted host
countries. For joint venture, it offer parent firm a limited control over decisions, especially where the
risks of corrupt behavior are high, it may increase internal pressures within an organization. The
review in Uhlenbruck et al (2006) paper explained that the higher the legitimacy of a firm, the lower
the probability that corruption will limit its activities, and thus the more likelihood that MNC will
consider to partner with local firms as to increase legitimacy. As a consequence, foreign firms might
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need to encounter situation to trade ownership for local legitimacy in order to reduce pressures of
corruption. In accordance to their finding that study the corruption impact and entry mode of
telecommunication industry in emerging countries, it indicates that those firms tend to choose joint
venture over wholly owned in corrupt environments, only if where arbitrariness (uncertainty) is high.
Lastly, perhaps it is right to say that corruption does matter. It has a real and important
impact on governments, businesses, and individuals. Voyer & Beamish (2004) concluded that MNEs
who seek to do business in an environment where corruption is pervasive in a dangerous position.
MNEs either accept the corruption as necessarily being the price of doing business and compromise
ethical conduct, or they can be subjected to the ramifications of failure to participate in the corrupt
necessities. In whatever way they select, corporate decision-makers face difficult choices.
2.2.3. Corruption in Asia-Pacific
This empirical study selects the Asia-Pacific region as it is main target destinations of
Automotive Japanese MNEs to set up the businesses next to top rank market, United States. Most of
researches often focus the analysis of FDI and corruption in emerging countries. Selecting
Asia-Pacific region consist of emerging countries and also developed countries like Australia or
New Zealand that represents relative lower level of economic growth compared to ASEAN countries.
Since the main purpose of this study is also to evaluate the survival rate of Japanese’s subsidiaries, it
is meaningful that countries in Asia-Pacific have varied level of corruption. The study done by
Alemu (2013) examined the effects of corruption on FDI inflow for 16 nations3 in Asian between
timeframe of 1995 to 2009. It derived the empirical evidence that corruption remains a significant
problem for inward FDI in Asian economies. Nevertheless, Asian economies have a high potential of
attracting enormous FDI into their economies due to their endowment in abundant skilled and
semi-skilled workforce as well as their geographical proximity to major FDI origin countries.
It also has evidence support that Japanese FDI is correlated with host-nation corruption.
Notwithstanding, in a Japanese context, it is interesting to observe that corruption is recognized as an
important consideration in location selection for companies (evidence from Sony, include guideline to
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assess location, Is it ethical or legal?) (Voyer & Beamish, 2004).
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CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESES
Section 1. CORRUPTION AND MNCS’ SUBSIDIARIES SURVIVAL PERFORMANCE
Japanese MNCs in automotive sector was forced to go overseas since the high appreciation
of Yen in 1980s and Asia-Pacific especially in ASEAN economies attracted them to establish firms
with an advantage of low labor cost and continuous growing of economic growth. For manufacturing
industry went transforming the structure, gaining the economies of scales. The Keiretsu system also
enhance as the background that once the car manufacturer move overseas, strong relationship
influenced suppliers within group to move to same host country to facilitate the productions and
strengthen the previous established support to each other. Despite the sparkling chance to capture
future business profit in this region, there also presence of high corruption level within these
growing markets.
Japan is listed as one of the high-developed countries in Asia and also in the world,
achieving high CPI score from Transparency Organization that proves high transparency of public
institutions. Anyhow, as the previous research has done that Japanese FDI is also take corruption
factor as one of the location consideration for their investment (Voyer & Beamish, 2004), there is
likelihood that Japanese MNCs were capable noticing a certain degree of corruption in host country
that may provide high risk and additional cost (bribes) but still it is tempting for Japanese MNCs to
perform business rather than left untapped, in order to develop strong position in international
market segment. Other study suggests that not all foreign investors care about corruption in the host
country. Although corruption has a negative impact on FDI because of the additional uncertainty and
costs, such costs vary depending on the country of origin of the FDI (Cuero-Cazurra, 2006). Such
notion can be implied in a way that, acknowledging the corruption condition in host country, but it is
not taken a large concern.
According to this assumption, in order to make an entrant to those host countries with high
pervasiveness of corruption, MNCs might involve in corruption with local governments to make an
access to the market successfully, secure the favorable land for build up factories, or speed up the
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queuing via bribery. Participating from the starting point can help the business to sustain longer in
the host country and hence, firms must encounter in circumstance to trade-off between perceived
corruption and market attractiveness (Mehlic et al, 2012). More generally, scholars have found that
the government regulation of entry into new markets, whether by foreign or by domestic firms, is
associated with higher levels of bribery and corrupt exchanges (Rodriguez et al, 2006).
For Japanese MNCs in automotive sector, the strong collaboration of Keiretsu group, it
yields high collaboration between manufacturer and suppliers in long-term relationship basis, viewing
as partner. The characteristic of Keiretsu system can enhance multiple key advantage skill to MNCs.
Its complex system has evolved over time to achieve high efficiency and business environmental
adaptability within the group. Usually the manufacturer will be the leader who launches objective or
new strategy to product development to their suppliers in order to derive well-designed products and
other-related activities. Toyota as a good example, it held periodically event, inviting suppliers to
shows their Kaizen (improvement point from previously) project of their own products. This Kaizen
project is also listed as Supplier’s KPI in Toyota Purchasing Department as performance evaluation
too. Regards the concrete establishment of learning point from Keiretsu system, Japanese MNCs able
to utilize this special experiences and capability when entering to the host country for international
expansion of its business. Firstly, in corrupt host country, Japanese MNC may benefit higher
negotiation skill among other foreign firms from different origin, to achieve favorable agreement from
local government without engaging in corruption with public officials, as the assumption that they are
able to convince and show promising action for investment in the host country. Secondly, in
Asia-Pacific region, Japanese name has impressive reputation as good investor with high success.
Especially once Japanese automotive sector has gained significant market share in U.S. market
following by Europe, therefore, to Asia-Pacific region, as a host country, it is meaningful for them to
attract Japanese firms to invest to promote growth to domestic economy and/or among the region. In
addition to uniqueness of Keiretsu system, if local government can attract the manufacturer to open the
production base, they are able to gain additional investment from Japanese suppliers within the same
Keiretsu group that will lead to higher amount of investment to domestic with low interest to thread for
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irregular payment. Hence, Japanese MNCs requires no effort to involve in corruption paying bribes to
get favorable entry to the market. According to this presumption, it has high opportunity that Japanese
MNCs able to overcome burden of government regulations or problem of entering host country with
high corruption degree due to they have been welcomed from eager local government side to establish
the business. Once those Japanese manufacturers and suppliers began expansion of foreign investment
there, it strengthen their domestic supply chain network such as distribution channel which is key
strategic for manufacturing firms. It can contribute great effect for their survival performance in that
corrupt host country. Thirdly, the secondary theory that might help Japanese firms to survive in the
corrupt host country is their own special human resource system, seniority system. As host country
with explicit degree of corruption normally exist in the context of developing country or
underdeveloped country. In Asia-Pacific, particularly countries South-east Asia are considered as
developing country with significant level of corruption. In that kind of environment usually presents
low labor wage and relatively poor welfare system to the worker in manufacturing industry as
domestic citizens view this sector as unskilled full job. Interesting perfect match to Japanese unique
human resource management, due to their organization has been designed to maintain the people
working in the company for lifetime. Its unique human resource style that is able to retain lifetime
employee is possibly achieve through good payment system with reasonable base salary plus bonus
payment particularly to Japanese automotive firms. Not only the payment system but they also
develop attractive welfare compared to other foreign origin MNCs to maintain the workers in the firm.
Apart of monetary and frill benefits for Japanese firms, it also spend certain amount of capital training
employees and workers in factory to become knowledgeable of their tasks with good mindset. This
lead to high capability to success for car manufacturers and also benefit to suppliers in cycle loop,
hence, Japanese companies are able to sustain in the business in long period of time. In comparison to
corrupt and non-corrupt host country, this system is presumably advantageous point to the corrupt
environment.
According to above explanation with unique characteristics of Japanese automotive MNCs,
I proposed against conventional idea, corruption cause negative impact to the foreign firm on FDI, that
28
Japanese MNCs are able to survive longer under corrupted environment. In order words, Japanese
MNC’s subsidiary’s survival rate is positively associated to host country with existence of corruption.
ࡴ૚: Japanese MNC subsidiaries’ survival is positively associated with corrupted environment
(Japanese MNC subsidiaries’ death rate is positively associated with non-corrupted environment)
Section 2. ENTRY MODE IN CORRUPTED HOST COUNTRIES
To strategically enter in the host country for MNCs, it is extremely important from the
starting point and post-entry survival of subsidiaries. Since for equity mode of choices; wholly
owned or joint venture mode. It displays distinct characteristics with benefit and disadvantages
regards the ownerships and power to control internal operations and assets as well as strategy to
interact with external parties such as local government. For MNEs, entering foreign market with
limited knowledge and information provide high risk and uncertainty. Finding local partners can
help reducing risks and meanwhile, providing access to location-specific knowledge and local
networks, fostering external legitimacy, and lowering direct costs of entry, with trade-off of control
and potential profits (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006).
Especially if corruption in host country is knowable, local government or those public
institutions have high power to demand bribes in an exchange of receiving licenses or legal matter in
order for MNCs to possibly obtain right to establish the business or just to speed up the queuing time
once that bureaucratic authority represents burden of regulations or red tape. MNCs can either
engage in corruption to acquire those offered benefits from host government. Joint venture with local
partners provides the channel to better contacts with politicians, knowing who and where to bribe in
an scenario that MNCs are not received direct contact or encounter themselves a threat from
bureaucratic corruption. Conversely, if MNCs behavior is to avoid those illegal actions, it is feasible
once they hold 100% control of company’s equity via “Wholly Owned Subsidiary” mode. The
limited control over decisions for joint venture mode in an uncertainty environment of corruption
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will most likely increases stress for MNCs. Therefore, it is suggest that in high environment
hazardous of corruption, totally opposite to Japanese MNCs that gain high level of transparency,
with such big difference, we suggest that MNCs has higher likelihood to select wholly owned
subsidiaries as entry strategy for the tight ability of control.
ࡴ૛ : In support to argument in Hypothesis1, the effect is greater when MNCs enter with
equity-mode via wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) rather than joint venture mode.
Section 3. CORRUPTION AND MNC’S LOCAL MARKET OBJECTIVE
To establish business in overseas often involve various reasons and objective of the parent
company. Majority of purposes can be classified into 2 approaches, Local market objective
(Market-seeking FDI) and Export objective (Efficiency-seeking FDI). Regarding purpose of
Efficiency-seeking FDI, foreign firms become more independent from local environment in the
sense that it focus to achieve efficient in economies of scale through exporting more than relies in
domestic market of host country. This has been confirmed by the study of Luo (2002) that the export
orientation decreases a foreign firm's interactions with local distributors, competitors, and buyers, the
threats from business culture specificity are also likely to be lower for export-focused MNCs than for
those with a local market focus. Further explanation has been given for local market-focused MNCs
with negative effect of environmental complexity, structural uncertainty, and cultural specificity on
capability exploitation and capability building, with stronger effect comparison to export-oriented
MNEs in a dynamic foreign market.
In the circumstance if host country has presence of high corruption and MNCs main
motivation for investing is to serve the local market, it can cause tremendously impact from the
additional incurred cost by corruption, as it is necessities for them to behave as embedded actors in
local institutional environments. Automatically, it can be implied that local market focused MNCs
put high reliance on local market, which means that survival performance is accounted by how well
they perform in domestic market. It affects the firm to adapt to local market and obey the rules of
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that nation. This in turn provides MNCs limited bargaining power over local governments. In that
case, MNCs are pressured to bribe in the same fashion as if they are paying taxes because it post
challenges for them to remain business if MNCs incline to pay bribes in host countries with a high
level of corruption (Lee & Hong, 2010). Additionally, in the case if local market focused MNCs has
willingness to outperform the domestic firms to achieve higher productivity for higher profit and has
acknowledged host country’s corruption as inevitable matter, the likelihood that those MNCs will
commit corruption activities is higher. Together with advantage of MNCs that most likely hold
higher amount of capital than domestic firms, it increases the chance MNCs to offer higher bribe to
local government. As the size of the bribes increases, more bureaucrats might become corrupt and/or
the bureaucrats might response additional red tape to extract more bribes from the MNE to bring
benefits to government officials in never-ending vicious cycle (Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007).
Accordingly, it expects that the local market focused MNCs in corrupted host country will have severe
possibility to sustain than export market focused MNCs.
ࡴ૜: In support to argument in Hypothesis1, the effect is greater when MNCs main
objective is to serve local market.
Research Questions & Hypotheses
۶૚: Japanese MNC subsidiaries’ survival is positively associated with corrupted environment
(Japanese MNC subsidiaries’ death rate is positively associated with non-corrupted environment)
۶૛ : In support to argument in Hypothesis1, the effect is greater when MNCs enter with
equity-mode via wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) rather than joint venture mode.
۶૜: In support to argument in Hypothesis1, the effect is greater when MNCs main objective is to
serve local market.
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY
Section 1. DATA SAMPLE
The primarily data source are derived from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Souran – Japanese
Overseas Investment (TOYO KEIZAI 1991-2014) annual directory of foreign investment of
Japanese firms, gathering for data of Japanese MNCs in Automotive sector investing in Asia-Pacific
regions; including Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Oceania regions between period 1991
and 2014. The sample covers nineteen countries4 with 1,730 MNCs’ affiliates. The remaining
variables are gathered through public sources, which will later describe in following section.
Section 2. VARIABLES
4.2.1. Dependent Variables
In this research, it aims to measure the survival rate of Japanese subsidiaries in the host
country through the timeframe from 1991 to 2014 (24 years duration). The survival rate was
computed by “Cox Hazard Survival Analysis” method, which will further describe in detail in
section 4.4).
4.2.2. Key Independent Variables
Corruption indicators
Originally, the paper has gathered indicator of country’s corruption level using Corruption
Perception Index (CPI5) published by Transparency published by Transparency Organization.
However, due to it project limited outlook of corruption conditions. Throughout the gathering and
research study, the CPI score indicator has been removed and substitute by 4 corruption indicators to
achieve in-depth detail of corruption characteristics perspectives.
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According to above reason, the paper applied several Corruption-related indicators from
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index in “Ethic & Corruption” and
“Public-sector performance” category in order to gain insight instead of the holistic view of CPI
score. Those selected Corruption-related indicators package contain; Irregular payments & bribes,
Burden of government regulation, and Efficiency of legal framework in setting disputes, and
Transparency of government policymaking. Noting that all these corruption variables is the reverse
indicator of the level of corruption. (These score are scale 1-7 and 7 represents the best score.).
“Irregular payments & bribes indicator” (Variable Bribes) was collected in term of illegal
payment in national-level, concerning with activities Imports/Exports, public utilities, annually tax
payments, awarding of public contracts and licenses, and obtaining favorable judicial decision.
Bribe is the most crucial corruption indicator for that country. Many researchers have supported that
in an corrupted environment, bureaucratic corruption will demand “bribes” in exchange of favorable
interest of briber in the sense that would otherwise not exist or execute it legally (John et al, 2003;
Voyer & Beamish, 2004; Mudambi et al, 2012). In the context of corrupted host country, “bribes”, an
extra payments in turn for favors to facilitate the business transaction (John et al, 2003) performed by
public officials to provide illegal informal exchanges involve the misuse of public power for private
gain through unauthorized payments of money or other in-kind substitutes (Mudambi et al, 2012).
“Burden of government regulation” (Variable BurdenGovtReg) will display country
whether there is an excessive regulation, which is accounted as contributor to corruption (Mudambi
et al, 2012). As explained earlier in the literature review section that multiple of empirical studies has
suggested that burden of regulation and corruption affect the location decisions of MNEs.
“Efficiency of legal framework in setting disputes” (Variable Effi_legaldisputes) shows
the idea of a dispute resolution mechanism to determine if there is a feasible way to create a body to
hear complaints by firms claiming to have lost business to rivals as the result of corruption (OECD). It
is crucial condition to examine if foreign firm able to survive under environmental hazardous when
they encountered difficulties and impact from corruption activities from their competitors in unfair
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situations, the quality to complaint and manage the dispute is hence can not be neglect in corrupted
host country.
“Transparency of government policymaking” (Variable PolicyTansparency) provides the
understanding of the extent of clarify of country’s laws, the extent and honesty of law enforcement,
the efficiency of the bureaucracy and most importantly the absence of corruption (Mehlic et al, 2012).
An inadequate transparency of laws and processes can be the starting of corruption activities and
became the main obstacle to operate business (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; John et al, 2003; Mudambi
et al, 2012). The barely transparent policy and regulations create impact to foreign firms as it enlarge
the bureaucratic inefficiency and decrease legal protection to MNCs. It can be implied with potential
hidden costs in the form of indefinite delay of issuing licenses and unexpected and frequent changes of
investment rules and regulations (John et al, 2003) that create uncertainty and lead to instability to run
business in long-run.
Firm-level indicators
“Entry mode” will be examined in this study to evaluate linkage of corruption and MNCs’
entry strategy. The information of TOYO KEZAI has label of Japanese Parent’s firm shares that
determines the how many percentage of equity that Japanese parent firm have in overseas
subsidiaries. For this study, we would like to determine difference of two equity entry modes;
Wholly owned subsidiaries and Joint venture. The variable is named as “WOS” represents with
dummy variable, 1 for Wholly owned subsidiary and 0 for Joint ventures. The variable “WOS” uses
cutoff point 95% of Japanese MNEs shares in their overseas affiliates. This degree of 95% share
cutoff has widely used in the WOS-related researches (Yiu & Makino, 2002; Youssef & Hoshino,
2003) in order to distinguish an equity percentage between Wholly owned subsidiaries and Joint
Venture mode.
4.2.3. Control Variables
This empirical study includes three main variables for Country-level control variables, Per
capita gross domestic product (PPP), Culture difference index (Hofstede), and the degree of market
openness.
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The variable Per capita gross domestic product (PPP) is measured as current dollars from
year 1991 to 2014, derived from official website of World Bank Organization. PPP is Gross
Domestic Product divided by total population can represents the total output of national market size
and is a significant explanatory variable for FDI (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). It displays the potential
consumption in that particular host country (Alemu, 2013; Uhlenbruck et al, 2006; Habib &
Zurawicki, 2002; Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007; Mehlic et al, 2012) which provide outlook for market
opportunity for MNEs. Using GDP is highly correlated with other corruption indicator variables.
Hence, PPP is expected to be good control variable of host country market. Regards the market
growth, as the previous empirical literature has stated in acknowledging a strong and negative
relationship between long-term growth and corruption. Therefore, this paper is decided to disregard
the usage of GDP growth in order to minimize the risk of interpretation according to previous
mentioned literature review.
The next control variable this paper introduced is “Hofstede’s Cultural distance 6” to
measure each significant culture dimension between Japan and other 19 host countries. It is widely
used in many literature reviews (Mehlic et al, 2012; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Ren et al, 2009; Leff,
1964). Hofstede index has been computed by Kogut & Singh formula.
The formula measure 4 out of 6 dimensions; Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism
VS Collectivism (IDV), Masculinity VS Femininity (MAS), and Uncertainty Avoidance Index
(UAI), computing the differences between Japan and Country j.
Hofstede cultural and geographic distance affects FDI and has also been proposed as one of
the most important drivers of International venture performance Identifying the conditions under
which national culture distance between partners (Ren et al, 2009) or so called as cultural proximity
between the two countries will facilitate FDI operations (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Additionally,
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due to corruption is deeply rooted in the psychological and social structure of the countries where it
exists (Leff, 1964),thus, Hofstede dimensions can be useful to perform as control factors.
The last control variable is “Open Market Freedom”, gathered from Heritage Foundation’s
Economic freedom Index. For the category of Open Market Freedom consists of trade freedom,
investment freedom, and financial freedom. It is important control because it indicates degree of host
country’s economy openness to attract foreign firms’ investments (FDI) (Alemu, 2013) and often
reflected successful efforts by domestic market interest to limit competition (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006).
Most of researchers also applied Open market freedom as degree of openness does affect MNCs
entry decision to invest in a host country (Mudambi et al, 2012; Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007;
Uhlenbruck et al, 2006; Alemu, 2013).
Section 3. STATISTICAL METHOD
Considerably main purpose to testing the survival rate of Japanese MNC’s affiliate in the
particular host country, the “Cox Hazard Survival Analysis” is selected as appropriate survival
analysis in this study running the data via using program of Stata 13th edition. The timeframe covers
from year 1991 to 2014 (24 year-duration). Firstly, setting each edition year of annually data
available from TOYO KEIZAI Institute as dummy variable; 0 = survive and inputting 1 = death, in
case if the data of that affiliate does not exist in the next edition year.
Section 4. MODEL FUNCTION
Cox proportional hazard model
This expression gives the hazard rate at time t for subject i with covariate vector Xi. Let Ci be the
indicator that the time corresponds to failure event (if Ci = 1 means firm exist and if Ci = 0 the time
means firm survives). Let Xi = {Xi1, … Xip} be the realized values of the covariates for subject i.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 WOS 0.253 0.435 1
2 Local Market 0.084 0.277 -0.069 1
3 Bribes 4.031 0.680 -0.056 0.177 1
4 BurdenGovtReg 3.622 0.538 -0.083 -0.051 0.437 1
5 Effi_LegalDispute 4.032 0.496 -0.050 -0.002 0.732 0.548 1
6 PolicyTransparency 4.256 0.771 -0.014 -0.070 0.588 0.329 0.533 1
7 PPP 5740.918 7339.461 0.030 0.035 0.752 0.200 0.394 0.403 1
8 Hofstede 3.201 0.52 0.035 -0.167 -0.098 0.359 0.298 -0.019 -0.196 1
9 OpenMarket 51.314 11.303 0.008 -0.032 0.468 0.137 0.109 0.232 0.639 -0.115 1
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Table 2. Results of Cox Hazardous rate of Japanese Automotive MNCs in Asia-Pacific
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
WOS -0.320***
(0.0992)
Bribes_CT 0.888*** 0.818***
(0.127) (0.131)
WOSxBribes 0.0854
(0.0888)
BurdenGovtReg -0.234** -0.268** -0.231**
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111)
Effi_legaldisputes -0.665*** -0.669*** -0.551***
(0.181) (0.193) (0.186)
PolicyTansparency -0.0314 -0.0275 0.00131
(0.0817) (0.0821) (0.0834)
PPP -6.18e-05*** -5.95e-05*** -5.81e-05***
(1.23e-05) (1.22e-05) (1.23e-05)
Hofstede 0.258** 0.278*** 0.266***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
OpenMarketScore 0.0147*** 0.0142*** 0.0168***
(0.00516) (0.00520) (0.00523)
Bribes 1.363***
(0.184)
LocalMarket 0.451***
(0.157)
LocalMKxBribes 0.305
(0.337)
Observations 15,230 15,230 15,230
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, containing the mean, standard deviation, and
correlations of all variables used in this survival analysis. Per capita GDP is positively correlated to
the score of Market Openness for 0.639. Meanwhile, Bribe is positively correlated to all other
variables for corruption indicators group especially to Efficiency of Legal in dispute setting,
supported by the study of OECD that the quality of authority to manage if any dispute occurred
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result from unfairness of corrupted activities among foreign firms is necessary and crucial.
The following table, Table 2 represents the outcome of Cox’s survival analysis of Japanese
MNCs’ subsidiaries in the selected Asia-Pacific host countries. Model 1 is purely analyzed the
survival rate with corruption indicators and control variables. Model 2 introduces the entry mode
under corrupted environment. Model 3a displays the result of survival for Local market-focused
MNCs and lastly, Model 3b added the entry mode of MNCs who has investment intention to become
local market oriented objective.
Hypothesis 1 (model 1) argues that under corrupted environment, it help the MNCs to
sustain longer in the host country. The survival rate of MNCs is strongly significant at p<0.01 (99%
confidence level) positively to variable Bribes, Market Openness and negatively to Efficiency of
Legal in Dispute setting and Per capita GDP. Again, noting that the score of corruption indicators
are in reverse meaning (higher score means best situation of each category). The result shows that
the survival rate is high if there is existence of irregular and bribe payment environment in the host
country. This is reasonable along with the low quality of legal in dispute setting and higher burden
of regulation will post lower chance for MNCs’ subsidiaries to survive. On the other side, higher
death rate for lower Per capita GDP is logical to the fact that lower consumption in host country
means lower chance for foreign firms to be profitable to survive locally. Not surprisingly, for
cultural distance (variable Hofstede) shows positively significant sign to the death rate of MNCs,
which means the higher the culture between home and host country, the higher risk to operate
business in the host country and influence to the firm’s survival performance. For Open Market
Score, it is positively correlated to the death rate due to if host country lower the barrier for foreign
firms to enter their markets, it mean the competition rate is increasing and therefore provide
challenge for MNCs to survive. The only insignificant variable is “policy transparency”. Thus, we
can conclude that Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Hypothesis 2 (model 2) claims that under corrupted environment, MNCs survival rate is
positively associated with equity entry mode of Wholly owned subsidiary rather than joint venture.
To prove that hypothesis, we tested the interaction between bribes and WOS. The centering method
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is introduced for variable bribes, derived as “Bribes_CT”. Then, we declare variable “WOSxBribes”
indicate the interaction of bribes and WOS mode. Similar to Model 1 all of the variables are
significant in same direction except the variable Policy Transparency. While Hofstede becomes
stronger from positive significant level of 95% in hypothesis 1 to 99% in hypothesis 2.The major
variable of entry mode is “WOS” shows strong negatively significant at 99% confidence level which
means it is true that Japanese MNCs entering with wholly owned subsidiary mode is positively
associated with the survival performance. It suggests that under corrupted environment, Japanese
MNCs tend to live shorter via joint venture entry mode compared to wholly owned subsidiaries.
However, the interaction effect of WOSxBribes is not significant in this model. The argument that
Japanese MNCs who enter via wholly owned subsidiary mode tend to survive longer in corrupt
environment is not support. Thus, Hypothesis 2 can be neglected.
Hypothesis 3 (model 3) investigates that under the corrupted environment, local
market-focused MNCs subsidiaries has lower likelihood to survive in the host country. Again,
besides the original variables that displays significant except variable policy transparency, variable
local market (dummy variable) indicates positively significant at p<0.01 to the survival rate.
Meaning that for local market-oriented MNCs, their survival performance tends to be low. However,
the interaction effect of variable “LocalMKxBribe” that test the connection between Japanese
MNC’s with local market focused objective in corruption environment, it is not significant in this
model. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION
Recently, corruption becomes hot issue globally especially in the context of foreign
investment. During the peak of globalization era where MNCs expand overseas, the assessment of
corruption condition in target host country post crucial decision for entry and post-entry survival
performance. This empirical study proposed different view of how MNCs performance in corrupted
environment of host country in term of survival performance instead of financial performance.
Survival performance is also proved to be one of key important indicator for MNCs success in
overseas. We found that Japanese MNCs subsidiaries can survive longer in the host country with
explicit degree of corruption, which is estimated to have relationship from the uniqueness of
characteristics when they perform business.
In general for host country assessment, the relationship of cultural difference and firm’s
survival performance is confirmed to be true, since the evidence of Hofstede is positively significant to
the firm’s death rate, decrease the survival rate of foreign subsidiaries (Zeng et al, 2013). The Per
capita GDP (PPP) and Open market score also proved significant result to subsidiaries’ survival rate
for every model, in the sense that it will increase the minimize the survival rate if PPP is low and
Open market score is high. In other word, lower consumption of population within host country with
higher competition because FDI restrictiveness condition is low.
The previous findings regards the corruption and MNCs performance suggests that MNCs
profitability is lower in corrupted host country (Lee & Hong, 2010) for US MNCs investing in
Asia-Pacific regions. Although, we proposed different measurement of survival instead of
profitability, but in order for a subsidiary to be able to stay longer, it must be profitable enough to
continue perform the business. Our evidence found interesting aspect that corruption environment
actually has positive significance to MNC’s survival performance. With high uncertainty and risk
that might cause the firm additional cost and challenges (Dahlstrom & Johnson, 2007; Habib &
Zurawicki, 2002; Mehlic et al, 2012; Uhlenbruck et al, 2006), but MNCs may able to overcome that
challenge without participating in corruption and run the business in long-term perspective in the host
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country with presence of corruption. The result of hypothesis 1 is great discovery against the
mainstream idea of scholars that corruption cause bad effects to foreign investments that lead to poor
performance as an outcome. But our finding contribute the new spectacle explaining that Japanese
MNC’s subsidiaries can survive longer in the corrupt environment or in other words their survival
performance is higher when the degree of corruption is greater in host country. This discovery is
contrast in the way that Japanese MNCs subsidiaries able to sustain longer in corrupt environment.
This may be true to the Japan as country of origin of FDI but not other foreign home country. As the
study of Cuero-Cazurra (2006) mentioned that how the interpretation of corruption whether it cause a
negative impact on FDI is depends on the country of origin of the FDI. As described in literature
review part, Japanese MNCs seems to acknowledge corruption as one of the location strategy for FDI.
However, from the main three possible backgrounds, capability of negotiation and management from
complex Keiretsu system, target home country FDI to Asia-Pacific local government, and
well-established special HR system and training, they are in superior position among other foreign
firms and host country government. Therefore, with higher degree of corruption existing in host
country, it can create assertive circumstance for Japanese automotive MNCs to get favorable offer
from local government easily and legally in absent to any illegal activities such as bribes. Since Japan
is country with high transparency of public authority, therefore, less likely to behave or adapt
themselves to corrupt activities even outside home country. Again, this may be true for Japan, as they
possess competitive advantage, perceived in the eyes of Asia-Pacific as well-known business
performer with loyalty reputation. The other possibility contribute to this finding perhaps due to
corrupt government officials are not dare to approach Japanese firms through illegal activities as an
exchange of payment because they are afraid of the side effect that Japan holds powerful status with
strong network of manufacturing industry that capable to knock over the business impact to the
domestic economy.
The evidence of foreign ownership suggests that for equity mode of entry in hypothesis 2,
discuss about the foreign ownership with entry strategy effect. MNCs who select wholly owned
subsidiaries is positively associated to the subsidiaries’ survival performance or in the other words, if
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MNCs who enter via joint venture mode is positively associated to the death rate. This hypothesis is
regrettably not found supported from the interaction effect between bribes and entry mode. It is still
skeptical to learn about how firm react to corruption as the findings shows that Japanese MNCs who
stays longer via wholly owned subsidiary mode but death rate is high for host country that have low
level of illegal payment involvement. Rodriguez et al (2006) shared the idea that in environments
where corruption is pervasive, a firm's political strategy must consider how to deal with potentially
corrupt officials and execute the appropriate management practices. One of the most discouraging
facets of corruption is persistence, and limited successes of anticorruption campaigns.
The findings of hypothesis 3 points out that foreign firm who focus heavily on local market
(market-seeking FDI) under corrupt environment encounter lower rate of survival, possibly lower than
other objectives (exporting or efficiency-seeking FDI) due the fact that high pressure to follow the
local circumstances with higher pressure demand from public authorities. From the previous research
of Lee & Hong (2010) found that U.S. MNCs subsidiary’s profitability is lower in the country with
corruption. However, although our finding displays the survival rate of local market
focused-Japanese MNCs subsidiary is positively associated but we cannot find significant interaction
for local market focused MNCs survival performance in corrupted environment.
In conclusion, this paper contributes from the evidence that Japanese automotive MNCs
subsidiaries can sustain longer in corrupt countries. The exploration of survival performance in
corrupt local government can give Japanese MNCs to consider this fact and able to confirm with
confidence to operate overseas business in corrupt environment with optimistic view. This is greatly
impact to the original understanding. Instead of feeling reluctant to perform business in target country
with significant degree of corruption, Japanese MNCs can utilize their unique capabilities to enter that
market without hesitation with careful mind.
43
CHAPTER 7. LIMITATION & SUGGESTION
The paper solely focused in particular one industry “Automotive-related sector”, which
may yield different effect to other industry or overall industries research study for Japanese MNCs.
Despite the one industry concentration, Automotive sector is qualified industry to achieve survival
rate due to this industry is determined as high capital intensive; involving setting up factory,
establishing concrete local supply chain network as well as labor intensive; engaging into a policy
and regulations interaction with local government. Thus, above described characteristics of
Automotive-related industry are necessarily spend time more than 10 years-basis. In addition, this
empirical study involve Asia-Pacific regions where there are varied degree of corruption level but
considered as attractive region for Japan MNCs to establish and nurture their businesses to gain
advantage of growing economic growth within the region.
As being said the side effect of using dependent variable of survival performance cannot
visualize the subsidiaries financial performance, limited implication whether firm enhance healthy
profitability in operating business in corruption environment or not. Lastly, due to few papers have
done the study about relationship of firm’s strategy response to corruption. It is therefore an
interesting question of how firms should manage when faced with public-sector corruption continues
to be among the most important and elusive research areas.
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